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Abstract
The deliberative conception of the public sphere has 
proven popular in the critical evaluation of the democratic 
role of media and communication. However, the concep-
tion has come under sustained critique from poststruc-
turalist-infl uenced theorists, amongst others, for failing to 
fully account for the exclusions that result from it being 
defi ned as a universal norm of public sphere deliberation. 
This paper examines how this critique may be answered. It 
does so fi rst by exploring how (sophisticated) deliberative 
theory can reply to the critique, and second by turning 
to the poststructuralist-infl uenced critics – specifi cally 
post-Marxist discourse theorists – and asking how they 
might provide a way forward. With respect to the fi rst, the 
paper fi nds that deliberative theory can, and often does, 
account for the exclusions in question much more than 
critics suggest, but that there remains concern about the 
conception’s radical democratic status given that expo-
nents (seem to) derive it extra-politically. With respect to 
the second, the paper fi nds that a post-Marxist discourse 
theory reading – that embraces radical contingency – of 
the deliberative public sphere conception provides a pure-
ly political framework for theorising deliberative exclusion 
(and associated politics), and thus off ers an ontological and 
democratic radicalisation of the public sphere concep-
tion. However, given the embrace of radical contingency, 
and thus acceptance of inelminable power, the paper 
concludes by indicating that this radicalisation may illicit 
concern about its radical democratic status.
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Introduction 
The deliberative conception of the public sphere has proven to be very popular 
in theorising and evaluating the role of media and communication in democratic 
politics (e.g. many articles in Javnost). The expansion in recent times of digital so-
cial networking and democratic-oriented movements – Arab uprisings, Occupy, 
Spanish indignados, Chilean student protests, and so on – is only likely to increase 
interest in the conception since it promises to provide the means for the critical 
evaluation and guidance of the full range of democratically-oriented communi-
cation that takes place through these movements and their media. However, the 
deliberative public sphere conception has also att racted much criticism. While a lot 
of this criticism has been solidly rebutt ed and silenced by deliberative democrats 
(see, for example, Habermas 1992a; Bohman 1996; Chambers 1996), some critique 
persists. This paper considers the deliberative public sphere conception with respect 
to one of the most sustained critiques, which comes (largely) from poststructural-
ist-infl uenced critics: the conception has exclusionary eff ects that are undemocratic. 
There are various formulations of the deliberative public sphere norm, but in 
general the conception is understood as a communicative space constituted by 
deliberation (rational-critical debate) over common problems, leading to critically 
(in)formed public opinion that can guide and scrutinise offi  cial decision making 
processes (see Habermas 1989, 1992a; Benhabib 1996; Bohman 1996; Chambers 
1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 1996, 2006). Rational-critical debate is broad-
ly understood by deliberative democrats to involve (the criteria of) reasoned, 
reciprocal, inclusive, equalitarian, sincere, and coercion-free argumentation over 
disputed issues, motivated by the aim of reaching understanding and agreement. It 
is important to note that deliberative democrats see this communicatively defi ned 
public sphere conception as both normative and descriptive: it is understood as a 
universal norm that is scientifi cally and/or theoretically derived or reconstructed 
from how everyday (“fl awed”) deliberative practices are, for how communication 
should be to enable democracy.1  
Advocates claim this deliberative conception of the public sphere is a radically 
democratic norm for the evaluation and guidance of democratic practice. It is 
claimed to be democratic on the grounds that approximating its deliberative criteria, 
as summarised above, will produce a sovereign public by constituting rational-crit-
ical public opinion that can hold decision makers accountable to “the public.” 
This understanding is claimed to be radically democratic on the grounds that the 
criteria are universal (to be extended equally to all concerned) and that sovereignty 
is based solely on the public’s will (those constituting the public having no other 
foundation for judgement and decision but themselves). Communication media 
are seen as central to the practical realisation of this deliberative understanding of 
radical democracy, enabling rational-critical debate and opinion formation across 
space and time (Goode 2006; Habermas 2006). 
However, various critics have argued that the deliberative public sphere con-
ception fails in terms of radical democracy because, among other things, it does 
not take into account the exclusion(s) involved in defi ning deliberation.2 Poststruc-
turalist-infl uenced critics have been particularly vocal, arguing that deliberative 
democrats promote one form of communication as the universal norm of public 
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sphere communication at the expense of other forms, without accounting for the 
resulting exclusion of those “voices”3 that do not conform to the specifi c form 
pronounced as democratically legitimate. Yet the conception continues to prove 
popular as a critical standard for understanding the democratic role of face-to-
face, mass-mediated, and digitally networked communication (e.g. Chambers and 
Costain 2000; Gimmler 2001; Goode 2006; Butsch 2007; and see many articles in 
Javnost). Given this continuing popularity and deployment, it is crucial for scholars 
of democratic communication to question and thoroughly investigate the deliber-
ative public sphere conception with respect to the exclusion critique, and thus its 
ongoing radical democratic status. Here I undertake such questioning and inves-
tigation. I do so in two ways. First, I examine the extent that deliberative theory 
can take into account the exclusions resulting from its defi ning of deliberation and 
the public sphere. This examination draws upon and pulls together existing work 
from “sophisticated” deliberative theory – particularly work stemming from Jürgen 
Habermas’ public sphere theory – that has not been adequately acknowledged 
by critics or systematically assembled to investigate the strength of the exclusion 
critique. Second, I turn to the poststructuralist-infl uenced critics – specifi cally those 
drawing on post-Marxist discourse theory given their interest in theorising radical 
democracy – and ask how their reading of the deliberative public sphere concep-
tion might move beyond negative critique and contribute to a radical democratic 
conception of the deliberative exclusions. 
My aim is not to provide a fi nal judgment on which approach (deliberative 
theory or post-Marxist discourse theory) is bett er – in the sense of being a more 
radically democratic understanding of the public sphere – and thus which should 
be embraced and deployed in thinking about and researching the public sphere and 
its exclusions. Rather, my aim is to explore and clarify the contribution and limits 
of each approach with respect to accounting for the exclusions that result from 
defi ning the public sphere norm, providing the basis for, fi rst, the reader to judge 
for themselves which approach to take and, second, future media-communication 
research and public sphere theorising. 
How Does the Deliberative Public Sphere Account for 
Its Exclusionary Effects?
One of the most persistently articulated critiques of the deliberative public sphere 
conception is that, despite its democratic aims, it fails to take account of its own 
exclusionary eff ects. Poststructuralist-infl uenced critics of deliberative democracy 
are particularly vocal on this point, arguing that the deliberative public sphere 
norm, which is supposed to defi ne democratically legitimate communication and 
to diff erentiate persuasion from coercion, actually supports domination by not 
accounting for, and in fact obscuring, the exclusions involved in this defi ning (Villa 
1992; Coole 1996; Mouff e 2000; Rabinovitch 2001; Norval 2007; Devenney 2009). In 
order to be considered legitimate deliberators, subjects must come to internalise 
the rules of the particular deliberative form of communication deemed universally 
valid or be excluded from the public sphere. As a result, participants whose natu-
ralised modes of communication are closer to what is determined to be valid are 
advantaged over others. That is, in order to be equally included, some participants 
must be more disciplined than others into fi tt ing the deliberative norm, disciplin-
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ing that involves the exclusion or repression of those voices judged illegitimate 
(be they irrational, strategic, or private). The problem for poststructuralists here 
is not with exclusion per se, since they see all norms as necessarily exclusionary, 
but rather that they see such exclusion as not being accounted for in theorising 
the deliberative public sphere and, in fact, obscured by the positing of a universal 
norm of public sphere deliberation. 
In examining how deliberative democrats can, and already do, respond to this 
critique it is important to put forward a sophisticated deliberative position. To 
critique a weak stylisation may be a useful strategy for discrediting the position 
under interrogation and for highlighting the strengths of the critic’s own argument, 
but problematising a sophisticated position advances theory further. To exemplify 
a sophisticated deliberative argument I draw particularly upon Habermas’ work 
and the work of those building upon it, which not only off ers a highly developed 
conception of the public sphere, but has been the basis for much deliberative theory 
and research, including with respect to the democratic role of media and communi-
cation (e.g., Chambers and Costain 2000; Gimmler 2001; Goode 2006; Butsch 2007; 
Hove 2009; and many articles within Javnost—The Public).
A sophisticated deliberative theorist can respond to the above critique with a 
number of persuasive arguments. First, s/he would argue that anyone who pro-
motes any conception of democracy cannot but make normative claims (whether 
implicit or explicit) as to what democracy is and is not, drawing a line between 
what is and is not democratic communication, and thus between democratically 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” exclusion. In fact, constitutive exclusion is not only 
understood by deliberative democrats as necessary, but elements to be “legitimate-
ly” excluded are clearly defi ned (being the negative of the deliberative criteria listed 
above – insincere, coercive, unequal, etc). Even the requirement for “inclusive” 
deliberation must be defi ned by exclusion.
However, second, in disagreement with poststructuralists, deliberative dem-
ocrats do not see norms, including those defi ning the boundary between what is 
democratically “legitimate”/“illegitimate,” as necessarily or equally normalising, 
at least in the disciplinary and (illegitimately) exclusionary sense described above 
in the poststructuralist-infl uenced critique. To act according to a norm is not 
necessarily the same as to be normalised, which is about social conformity and 
de-individuation (Alexander 2001).4 Communicative norms can be more or less 
democratic, more or less autonomy enhancing, more or less refl exive, more or 
less coercive, and so on. Of course, any norm will demand certain behaviour from 
participants, and thus constitute subjectivity in particular ways. But deliberative 
democrats do not see such demands and constitution as necessarily disciplinary 
and exclusionary. Deliberative democrats see the public sphere norm as providing 
a communicative structure through which critical refl ection on constraining and 
exclusionary social relations, and possibilities for greater inclusion and freedom, 
can take place (Habermas 1996). As Chambers (1996, 233-234) argues, public sphere 
deliberation involves “the endless questioning of codes,” the reasoned questioning of 
normalisation. Through deliberation participants are constituted as rational-critical 
subjects, and as such deliberation provides an opening towards autonomy rather 
than a movement towards subjugation and social conformity.
Third, sophisticated deliberative democrats do not claim to have fi nally iden-
tifi ed and reconstructed the true and infallible public sphere norm. Rather, they 
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argue that since the deliberative public sphere conception is scientifi cally-theoret-
ically derived or reconstructed from social practice, rather than metaphysically 
founded, it is hypothetical or provisional: context bound, fallible, and revisable 
(Habermas 1985, 86; Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1996; Markell 1997). In particular, 
the norms’ derivation/reconstruction is understood to be related to a particular 
social-cultural context rather than to a value-free process. For example, Haber-
mas’ particular deliberative public sphere reconstruction, which has att racted 
criticism for an over-emphasis on “rationality” in contrast to “aesthetic-aff ective” 
forms of communication, has been infl uenced by his childhood experience of Nazi 
propaganda (Habermas 2004). The norm’s situated and revisable status explains 
variations in the specifi c deliberative public sphere conceptions that theorists de-
rive or reconstruct from diff erent practices.5 Moreover, this status means that the 
norm is open to ongoing scientifi c-theoretic challenge and revision on the basis of 
practical empirical evidence, challenge and revision that this paper is part of and 
that deliberative democrats participate in through engagement with their critics 
so as to refi ne their derivation/reconstruction of the norm (Habermas’ work is 
exemplary here), including refi ning what is deemed democratically “legitimate” 
exclusion. Furthermore, fallibility means that in practice there will be democratically 
“illegitimate” exclusions as a result of the application of a deliberative norm that 
is not-yet fully derived/reconstructed, exclusions that the ongoing revision of the 
norm are aimed at eliminating (as far as possible). 
Fourth, in parallel with their accounting for the exclusionary eff ects of the delib-
erative public sphere norm, sophisticated deliberative democrats also acknowledge 
the exclusionary eff ects of cultural contexts on the practical interpretation and ap-
plication of norms. Deliberative norms and the strength of arguments will always 
be culturally interpreted, leading to some voices being advantaged over others 
simply due to their situated interests and ways of speaking aff ording them more 
“reasonable” voice – as satisfying particular understandings of good argument 
(Habermas 1992b, 477; 1996a, 324; Dryzek 2000; Smith 2011). In addition to the 
exclusionary eff ects of diff erent cultural contexts, “illegitimate” exclusions result 
from uneven distribution of the political-economic capital (principally time and 
money) necessary for eff ective participation in deliberative practice, as well as from 
various forms of direct coercion, such as bribery, threats, and violence (Habermas 
1996). Such inequalities and coercion in “communicative power” largely arise as 
the result of the domination of communication by states, corporations, elites, and 
infl uential interest groups (Habermas 2006). Moreover, the positing of a deliberative 
public sphere norm works to illuminate, rather than ignore or obscure, commu-
nicative inequality, coercion, and exclusion. This illumination is in fact the very 
purpose for explicating the deliberative public sphere norm: to facilitate critique 
(by participants and observers alike) of existing political norms and practices so as 
to bring to the fore deliberative inequalities and exclusions and to think about how 
to reduce these and advance democracy: hence the enthusiasm for the deliberative 
public sphere conception by those involved in media-democracy research.
Finally, sophisticated deliberative theorists have not only taken account of ex-
clusion in deriving and approximating a universal public sphere norm, but have 
increasingly theorised the politics of exclusion in deliberative practice (in practice if 
not in the public sphere norm’s derivation/reconstruction), including in relation to 
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mass media and digital communication (Gimmler 2001; Butsch 2007; Hove 2009; 
Wessler 2008). More specifi cally, a range of deliberative theorists have explored 
the role of “non-deliberative” forms of communication (including those deploying 
aesthetics, aff ect, civil disobedience, and “rhetoric”6) in contesting “illegitimate” 
public sphere boundaries, and some of these theorists have even claimed that ago-
nistic contestation is complementary to, or congruent with, deliberation (Habermas 
1985, 1992a, 1996; Benhabib 1996; Markell 1997; Dryzek 2000; Brady 2004; Fung 2005; 
Dupuis-Déri 2007; Knops 2007; Chambers 2009; Hove 2009; Rostbøll 2009). More-
over, many of these theorists have addressed the politics of exclusion in deliberative 
practice by taking up “counter-publics” theory, which has been infl uenced by, and 
in turn infl uenced, a range of critical and feminist theorists (Negt and Kluge 1993; 
Fraser 1997; Squires 2002; Warner 2002) and rhetorical scholarship (Asen 2000; Asen 
and Brouwer 2001; Hauser 2007; Huspek 2007). As a result, deliberative theory and 
research, and particularly work exploring the democratic role of communication, 
now embraces the need for multiple and vibrant counter-publics – alternative de-
liberative arenas that form in response to, and may foster challenges to, exclusion 
from dominant public spheres. And a variety of media-public sphere research has 
already shown how such counter-publics can be, and are being, fostered through 
a range of communication media.7  
The Democratic Defi cit
The above points seem to provide a thorough reply to the poststructu-
ralist-inspired critique of the failure of the deliberative public sphere conception 
to adequately account for its exclusionary eff ects. The sophisticated deliberative 
democrat defends the importance and possibility of scientifi cally-theoretically 
deriving or reconstructing a universal norm of public sphere argumentation that 
involves certain “legitimate” exclusions of undemocratic elements while agreeing 
that “illegitimate” exclusions will occur in the application of any public sphere 
norm due to failure or imperfection in both the norm’s derivation/reconstruction 
and in deliberative practice. Thus, for deliberative democrats, improving upon the 
scientifi c-theoretic derivation/reconstruction and the practical implementation of 
the deliberative public sphere norm is a never ending task. Moreover, deliberative 
democrats have expanded deliberative theory to account for the politics of delib-
erative exclusion in practice, conceptualising how voices illegitimately excluded 
from public spheres may contest their exclusion and become heard.
However, this response does not in-fact get to the core of the poststructural-
ist-infl uenced critique, which stems from a (subtle) disagreement with deliberative 
democrats about the status of any public sphere norm. I will briefl y outline this 
disagreement and subsequently the core concern. The disagreement stems from 
the poststructuralist commitment to an ontology of radical contingency: to the 
ultimate unfi xity and thus contestability of all social relations/objectivity.8 Given 
radical contingency, they insist on the inherent instability of all meaning/identity 
and the inescapable failure of all communication, and hence the impossibility of the 
existence (and derivability) of a universal deliberative norm (Coole 1996; Mouff e 
2000). Thus, for the poststructuralist, any norm of public sphere deliberation – of 
“legitimate” democratic communication and exclusion – will be inherently lacking 
and contestable and thus in the last instance be determined/constituted politically, 
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even when deemed to be identifi ed and derived/reconstructed through scienti-
fi c-theoretic investigation (Devenney 2009; Jezierska 2011).
In contrast to this poststructuralist embrace of radical contingency and politics 
all the way down, deliberative democrats claim, in theory at least, to derive/recon-
struct a universal public sphere norm from out of everyday practice. This suggests 
the possibility of an extra-political – and thus extra-democratic – determination of 
“legitimate/illegitimate” public sphere boundaries. In theory we can get outside 
politics to identify a universal norm, which explains the reason for only considering 
the politics of exclusion in relation to deliberative practice and not in relation to the 
norm’s derivation/reconstruction. Forms of communication, exclusion, and associat-
ed politics are understood to be, in the fi nal instance, “legitimate” or “illegitimate” 
not by the political/democratic decisions of the public concerned but by the extent 
that they match or complement (in the case of non-deliberative forms) a scientif-
ically-theoretically explicated universal normative conception of rational-critical 
debate (e.g. Chambers 1996; Markell 1997; Brady 2004; Fung 2005; Dupuis-Déri 
2007; Knops 2007; Smith 2011). Smith’s (2008) argument, with respect to the politics 
of exclusion in practice, exemplifi es the deliberative position here, the justifi cation 
for activism being aligned to the extent that it accords with underlying “normative 
principles” of deliberative democracy. And this applies to the att empt to theorise 
the role of non-deliberative forms of communication in contesting “illegitimate” 
exclusion. As Norval (2007, 67) states, “alternative forms of expression are system-
atically subordinated to what is treated [by deliberative democrats] as the standard, 
namely rational argumentation.” Norval (2007, 68) shows this subordination to be 
the case even with theorists like John Dryzek who, while att empting to go beyond 
the problematic reason/rhetoric dichotomy, make emotion fi nally answerable (and 
as such subordinate) to reason. In earlier work, I too found a similar restriction 
necessary when theorising the role of aesthetic-aff ective modes of communication 
in relation to the Habermasian public sphere (Dahlberg 2005). It is true, as noted 
earlier, that specifi c deliberative rules practically applied in everyday situations 
are seen as open to public contestation, but this is not true for any universal norm 
of public sphere deliberation, which applied rules are judged against. It is also true 
that any universal norm of deliberation is understood as “fallible,” but this is so 
only in the context of scientifi c-theoretic derivation/reconstruction and not by way 
of the practical deliberation constituting the public sphere. 
From this disagreement about the ontological status of the norm (universally 
embedded or politically constituted), we can identify the core of the poststructur-
alist-infl uenced critique of the deliberative public sphere: the deliberative public 
sphere conception involves an extra-democratic determination of the deliberative 
conception of normative public sphere communication, legitimate exclusion, and 
associated politics. “The public” is not fi nally in determination of the prescription 
of normative public sphere communication that everyday practical interaction is 
to be judged against. Moreover, to rephrase the critique at the start of this paper, 
those voices disadvantaged or excluded by this (extra-democratic) norm are not 
able, through practical deliberation, to legitimately contest and rewrite it. Hence, 
the public is neither fully sovereign nor equal, putt ing into question the radical 
democratic status of the deliberative conception. 
In reply, sophisticated deliberative theorists (would) argue that they only aim to 
derive/reconstruct norms that are already implicit within and constituted through, 
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if in nascent form, everyday practical interaction. As such, the deliberative public 
sphere norm – and subsequently the defi nition of “legitimate” communication, 
exclusion, and associated contestation – is not to be understood as extra-political 
and extra-democratic, but rather as practically and democratically achieved: as 
constituted and grounded by the public and thus radically democratic. Yet post-
structuralist critics maintain that this very claim – to the existence and explication 
of a universal public sphere norm – overlooks and obscures the necessary politics 
involved, including the politics involved in defi ning “legitimate”/“illegitimate” 
communication, exclusion, and contestation – and thus the claim blocks theorising 
how the public sphere conception may be democratically determined.
We have come to a deadlock here, in which the argument cannot be adjudi-
cated without prior ontological and epistemological commitments being made: 
is the norm universally embedded or radically contingent, and how do we come 
to know either to be true? I am not going to make a commitment one way or the 
other and bring judgement to bear. This is not my concern here. Rather, I will take 
the examination in another direction, turning to the poststructuralist-infl uenced 
critics and asking what they can off er from an analysis that embraces an ontology 
of radical contingency and thus that embraces the impossibility of the existence 
and derivation of a universal norm. In other words, what can a poststructuralist 
position contribute, beyond negative critique, to conceiving a radically democratic 
public sphere that accounts for exclusions (and associated politics) in the drawing 
of deliberative boundaries?  
There are many directions one can go in order to explore this question given that 
there are a range of poststructuralist approaches available, and each of these can be 
deployed in various ways. I will explore the question through a poststructuralist 
discourse theory reading of the deliberative public sphere. More specifi cally, I will 
deploy the post-Marxist current of discourse theory stemming from the work of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouff e, which draws on a poststructuralist reading 
of the Marxist tradition. Post-Marxist discourse theory is particularly applicable 
here given its concern for conceptualising radical democracy in the context of 
ineliminable exclusion and, moreover, because its adherents have not only been 
some of the most vocal poststructuralist-infl uenced critics of the deliberative public 
sphere, but have often developed discourse theory in direct critical engagement with 
deliberative theory (see, for example, Mouff e 2000, 2005a; Devenney 2004; Norval 
2007). Moreover, in contrast to those poststructuralist critics who simply discard 
the “public sphere” (see for example, with specifi c respect to media-communication 
theory, Nguyen and Alexander 1996; Poster 1997), post-Marxist discourse theorists 
at various moments deploy the conception, accepting its importance for concep-
tualising radical democratic politics when thought of as a pluralist and confl ict 
ridden political space that values multiplicity and struggle, rather than a space of 
rational consensus (see, for example, Laclau 1996a, 120-121, 2005; Mouff e 2005a, 
2005b, 2007; Marchart 2011).9 I will now briefl y outline post-Marxist discourse 
theory, giving (somewhat stylised) news media examples for the specifi c purpose 
of illustrating the concepts necessary for the subsequent discourse theory reading 
of the deliberative public sphere. 
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Post-Marxist Discourse Theory 
Post-Marxist discourse theory is complex and rapidly evolving, and would 
be impossible to outline in full here. However, for the purposes of the reading to 
follow, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of the meaning of “discourse”10 
and a few other related post-Marxist discourse theory concepts. Laclau and Mouff e 
(2001) understand discourse as any relational system of meaning constituted by the 
“articulation” of “elements” (concepts, objects, and practices) into a structured total-
ity. Articulation is seen as taking place through the practice of “hegemony,” which 
involves one element, a “privileged signifi er,” being partially emptied of meaning 
and coming to assume the representation – which also involves the constitution – of 
a shared (universal) identity that links otherwise heterogeneous elements into a 
discursive whole, and in the process modifi es the meaning of each (Laclau 1996a, 
43, 2005, 70). Take for example the dominant discourse of “news.” The meaning 
of news can be understood to be hegemonically att ained through the signifi er 
“news” being partially emptied of its particular meaning – such as being “new” 
stories – and coming to represent a universal “news” identity, which is constituted 
in journalistic practices by the articulation of a series of other elements, including 
“balance,” “objectivity,” “relevance,” “timeliness,” and so on, each of which are 
subsequently modifi ed in this relation, coming to act as “news values” or “news 
codes.” These “news values” are not simply abstract rules but are constituted and 
realised through news practice, in the process constituting what is told and how.11
Hegemony thus involves the systematisation of meaning and constitution of 
identity. And yet the resulting hegemonic relation (and thus discourse) is always 
radically contingent. Discourse (meaning/identity) is dependent – is contingent – 
upon a particular selection and combination of elements that rules out a myriad of 
other possible selections and combinations. Moreover, this contingency is logically 
necessary (i.e., is radical or ontological): any particular articulation of elements 
requires that other fi xations are never fi nal or total. This means that contingency 
is both a condition of possibility and impossibility of discourse. It also means that 
discourse is dependent upon a radical exclusion, an “excess” necessarily escap-
ing categorisation and systematisation, which in turn means that excess is also a 
condition of possibility and impossibility of hegemonic articulation (Laclau 2005; 
Thomassen 2005). In the example of the “news,” the excess includes all that is left 
out of the articulation “objective,” “balance,” “timely,” etc., and all the contents and 
narrative forms that as a result are excluded in the telling of any news story. These 
exclusions enable “news” to gain identity and “the story” to be told coherently as 
“news” (as “objective,” “balanced,” etc.), but they also mean that the “news” is 
always a particular hegemonic construction and any resulting story is never the 
full story.
Hence, discursive articulation is always political, it is about what is included 
and excluded in the struggle to establish a taken for granted order against the 
impossibility of full closure. The formation of discourses “always involves the ex-
ercise of power, as their constitution involves the exclusion of certain possibilities 
and a consequent structuring of the relations between social agents” (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000, 4). But excess means that discourses remain open and unstable, 
vulnerable to those elements necessarily excluded or escaping from articulation, 
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and thus vulnerable to re-articulation (Howarth 2000, 103-104). This re-articula-
tion is contextually aff ected, that is, it is more likely in some instances than others. 
First, hegemonic systems are disrupted, and re-articulation is invited, when the 
ontological condition of radical contingency comes to the fore in “dislocatory” 
events – “out-of-the-ordinary” and unexpected events “that cannot be symbolised 
by an existent discursive order, and thus function to disrupt that order” (Howarth 
2000, 111). Such events include sudden ecological changes, fi nancial meltdowns, 
or unannounced spectacular and seemingly “irrational” acts by (previously) “un-
known” agents. These events illuminate the discursive order’s radical contingency 
and can lead to its “dislocation,” subsequently inviting new articulations and 
thus new hegemonic (discursive) formations that allow (some) excess to become 
represented in re-articulations of the order (and thus no longer excessive). For in-
stance, we can think of how the precariousness of the “news” discourse was made 
apparent in 2011-12 in the UK, if not worldwide, by the “phone hacking scandal,” 
in which certain news practices that cannot be symbolised as part of the hegemonic 
understanding of “news” were found at the very heart of the journalism practices 
of News of the World, amongst other newspapers. 
However, and this is the second point with respect to context aff ecting re-artic-
ulation, re-articulations are, like all articulation, infl uenced by those “sedimented” 
meanings unaff ected by the dislocation in question. As Thomassen (2005) explains, 
drawing upon Laclau, articulation is contingent but not arbitrary. Discursive 
articulation “takes place in an already partly sedimented terrain permeated by 
relations of power” (ibid, 295). As a result, in any particular case, some (re-)artic-
ulations are more likely than others. For example, given the sedimentation of the 
linkage between “free press” and “free markets” within social systems dominat-
ed by neo-liberal capitalist discourse, proposals for media regulation in light of 
revelations of “anti-news” practice are, in the absence of an eff ective challenge to 
neo-liberalism, largely conceived in terms of industry “self-regulation” or mini-
mal government regulation to ensure “competition” (my specifi c reference point 
here is recent debates in Australia about media regulation in the context of two 
government reviews of the media). 
As well as re-articulation being limited by sedimented social relations, radical 
contingency and the possibility for re-articulation can be (or is) discursively sup-
pressed by “ideology,” where ideology, following Laclau (1996b, 2006), involves 
concealing excess, which leads to the misrecognition of the impossibility of the 
ultimate closure of discourse. In other words, ideology points to the naturalising 
of a particular discursive system, the process by which a discourse becomes de-
contested (Norval 2000, 328). The most explicit and possibly most prevalent ideo-
logical strategy, according to discourse theorists, is the drawing of an antagonistic 
frontier that clearly demarcates an “us” from a “them” (“the enemy”). The naming 
and explicit exclusion of an enemy operates to obscure excess and strengthen the 
hegemony (universalism) of a discourse by mythically representing all exclusion, 
and seeming to do so legitimately. For example, the case for the self-regulation of 
news can be strengthened by being explicitly contrasted to what is represented as 
self-regulation’s Other – total state control (signifi ed by “China,” “North Korea,” 
“Iran,” etc.,), while obscuring alternatives such as citizen elected regulatory bodies. 
The News of the World phone hacking scandal off ers a second illustration: in the 
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aftermath of the hacking revelations, news organisations in the UK and throughout 
the world moved swiftly to (re-)align (i.e. re-signify) themselves and their products 
as “news,” and in the process reassert the hegemonic “news” discourse, by naming 
and expelling from the news community un-newsworthy practices (phone hacking) 
and those who were identifi ed as responsible for introducing such practice (certain 
scapegoated individuals and the associated iconic news institution). 
We now have the necessary concepts to undertake a brief discourse theory 
reading of the deliberative public sphere conception. The reading will be of a nec-
essarily simplifi ed and stylised deliberative model, given that deliberative theory 
is too complex and pluralist to represent in the space available here. However, my 
aim in what follows is not to att empt a “true” representation of “the” deliberative 
position, but to use the reading for the purpose of exploring how a poststructuralist 
(radically contingent) grounded position might contribute, if at all, to the theorisa-
tion of a radical democratic public sphere conception with respect to the exclusions 
resulting from defi ning deliberative boundaries. 
A Post-Marxist Discourse Theory Reading of the 
Deliberative Public Sphere 
Following discourse theory, deliberative public sphere criteria and practice can 
be said to be discursively constituted. A hegemonic system of discourse defi nes, at 
any one time, what it means to be deliberative, and thus the boundaries of public 
sphere interaction. In order for deliberation to be carried out in a “rational” way, 
order must be brought to chaotic social space via normative deliberative criteria, 
and in the process certain forms and contents of communication discursively 
excluded (explicitly or as unnamed excess). I will focus here on how discourse 
theory understands such exclusion and associated politics in relation fi rst to the 
deliberative public sphere conception and then to deliberative practice.
In terms of the deliberative public sphere conception, we can say from post-
Marxist discourse theory that the (or any) deliberative norm is constituted through 
the articulation of a range of elements drawn from various democratic traditions, 
including autonomy, critique, equality, inclusion, inter-subjectivity, participation, 
reasoning, reciprocity, and refl exivity. These elements become hegemonically 
articulated into a discursive whole – and their meaning modifi ed in the process – 
through being represented by, and as such identifi ed as having a common relation 
to, the signifi er “deliberative public sphere” (or “rational-critical debate”). As a 
result, the deliberative public sphere conception assumes a (seemingly) universal 
identity. However, diff erent articulations will change the meaning of both part and 
whole, demonstrating the particularity of the discourse. For example, “autonomy” 
will change its meaning, as will the discourse as a whole, if articulated with “free 
markets” rather than with “equality.” Articulation is, of course, not random but 
infl uenced by the sedimented meanings of elements. For example, “deliberation” 
is clearly associated in modern Western thought with “refl exivity” and “reason,” 
while “public” is associated with “openness,” and “inclusion.” As a result we see 
family resemblances amongst diff erent understandings of, and off shoots from, 
deliberative democracy and the deliberative public sphere.
The hegemonic raising to universal status of a particular deliberative public 
sphere conception, obscuring other possible articulations, is supported by the 
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drawing of an antagonistic frontier, that is, by defi ning “deliberation” against what 
it is not: any communication signifi ed as “coercive,” “unreasoned,” “instrumen-
tal-strategic,”12 “unrefl exive,” “hierarchical,” “closed,” and so on. These signifi ers, 
in discourse theory terms, are framed as the “enemys” of deliberation, to be ex-
cised from the deliberative public sphere. The explicit exclusion of these elements 
operates to mythically suture the deliberative discourse: their exclusion makes the 
discourse seem whole/universal in that it seems to represent both democratic and 
undemocratic aspects of communication. In the process, the deliberative discourse 
ideologically obscures the exclusion of other, unnamed, elements (and thus voices) 
that exceed, and would tell the lie to, its neat boundaries and universal normative 
claims, excessive elements such as aesthetics, embodiment, and passion, as feminist 
critics in particular have pointed out (Squires 1998; Young 2000; Mouff e 2002; Nor-
val 2007). Such excess is an always potential threat to the norm’s universal claim, 
the basis for contestation and re-articulation of the boundaries of the deliberative 
public sphere conception (including the basis for the poststructuralist critiques of 
the conception, and also for the deliberative revisions).   
This discourse theory reading can be considered a radicalisation of the delib-
erative public sphere conception in both ontological and democratic terms due 
to “deliberation” and “the public sphere” being based upon particular discursive 
(hegemonic) articulations and associated inclusions and exclusions, rather than 
upon a universal rational-critical norm of communication (however hypotheti-
cally conceived). The public sphere conception becomes radicalised ontologically 
through being understood as radically contingent (a hegemonic construction). 
And as such it is radicalised democratically: “the public” must explicitly decide 
their own deliberative norms without reference to any other ground, including 
to universal rational-critical debate. This radicalisation – the public sphere norm 
(and hence “the public” and “sovereignty”) as hegemonically constituted – also 
means the deconstruction of any theory-practice divide. Public sphere norms, and 
thus legitimate defi nitions of deliberation and exclusion, are made and re-made on 
the basis of hegemonic practices, whether within “everyday” communication or 
(specialised) “scientifi c-theoretic” investigation. Hegemonic politics is also seen as 
applying to the contents of everyday deliberative practice. Post-Marxist discourse 
theory suggests that, just as with the struggle over the public sphere deliberative 
norm, at any one time there are likely to be a number of discourses vying to de-
fi ne what particular contents are more and less legitimate for public deliberation 
(inclusion/exclusion). 
This hegemonic struggle to defi ne both deliberative norms and contents will 
be dominated by taken-for-granted discourses. With respect to the defi ning and 
institution of deliberative norms, participants within particular debates (includ-
ing academic ones) will draw upon socio-culturally available interpretations and 
criteria of deliberation. With respect to the contents of deliberation, one discourse 
(e.g., media self-regulation) may come to dominate public sphere deliberations on 
a particular issue (e.g. media regulation) by explicit exclusion of other discourses 
(e.g., state control and regulation), sett ing up an antagonistic frontier that is itself 
constituted upon the occlusion of unnamed (excessive) others (e.g., community, 
citizen, and autonomous options). Sophisticated deliberative democrats, as noted 
earlier, would agree that norms and contents of deliberation are structured by so-
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cial context. However, discourse theory provides a means – a coherent conceptual 
framework – for theorising the logic and politics of the deliberative exclusions 
involved, without recourse to an extra-political ground. 
To recap, given a post-Marxist discourse theory reading, we can talk about 
deliberative public sphere boundaries as discursively constituted and politically 
struggled over. In any theorisation and practice of deliberation, the defi ning or 
policing of boundaries of what can and cannot be said will be subject to ideologi-
cal moves, including the sett ing up of antagonistic frontiers that institute explicit 
exclusions and obscure alternative conceptions of the public sphere excessive to 
the hegemonic conception. But since excess is radical, there is always the possibility 
of political contestation of the boundaries of hegemonic deliberation and hence 
re-articulation of the public sphere conception. 
A Radicalised Public Sphere?
This paper has examined and clarifi ed two approaches to a radical democrat-
ic conception of exclusions resulting from deliberative public sphere boundary 
drawing.13 I fi rst outlined how deliberative public sphere theory takes exclusion 
into account much more extensively than poststructuralist-infl uenced critics claim. 
However, I also argued that the poststructuralist critique does raise concern about 
the public sphere conception being (fi nally) determined extra-politically in deliber-
ative theory, and hence concern about limits to its radical democratic status. Given 
this concern, I turned to the poststructuralist critics, specifi cally to post-Marxist 
discourse theorists, and asked how they might contribute – on the basis of radical 
contingency – to theorising the deliberative public sphere exclusions in such a 
way as to ensure the radical democratic value of the conception. I showed that a 
post-Marxist discourse theory reading of the deliberative public sphere off ers a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for taking account of the exclusions and 
associated politics that not only defi ne but also challenge and re-articulate the 
(discursive) boundaries of the public sphere conception in theory and practice. 
In the process, the discourse theory reading could be argued to ontologically and 
democratically radicalise the public sphere conception. This conception is ontolog-
ically radicalised as it is conceived as radically contingent, and it is democratically 
radicalised as this poststructuralist ontology means that the public sphere norm 
(and the public sphere itself) is defi ned only by hegemonic/political struggle and 
not by any extra-political ground. 
However, instead of a democratic radicalisation, the embrace of radical con-
tingency could be read as undermining the democratic status of the conception, 
thus turning the table on the poststructuralist critique. The concern is that, given 
radical contingency, there is no ground outside power and sedimented cultural 
understandings upon which to base public sphere norms and contents, and for 
judging the legitimacy of any deliberation, exclusion, and associated forms of pol-
itics. Deliberative democrats, amongst others, would argue that a poststructuralist 
(and discourse theory) reading does not radicalise but relativise the public sphere 
conception – giving it over to power, domination, and exclusion – by basing it on 
pure politics (radical contingency). The pressing question then is, given a discourse 
theory (and poststructuralist) ontology and hegemonic logic, (how) can evaluation 
of the democratic value of any deliberative public sphere practice and associated 
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exclusions/politics (or of anything else, for that matt er) be undertaken? Can we 
recover the public sphere’s critical purchase so important to its deployment, par-
ticularly by media-communication theorists and researchers? Or is the idea that 
the discourse theory reading democratically radicalises the public sphere concep-
tion because conceiving it as achieved purely through hegemonic struggle fatally 
undermined by its own logic? These questions, developing from concern about 
the radical democratic status of the discourse theory reading of the public sphere 
conception with respect to exclusion, provide the starting point for future research.14
Thus, concern remains about the radical democratic status and limits of both 
the deliberative public sphere conception and the discourse theory reading of 
this conception. Examining these two approaches and identifying the associated 
concerns has been this paper’s objective. The reader is invited to judge from this 
examination, drawing from their own intellectual and political commitments, which 
is a more satisfying and/or more radically democratic approach to conceiving the 
exclusions from deliberative public sphere boundary drawing and, moreover, 
invited to further explore the limits of each.
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Notes:
1. Deliberative democrats derive or reconstruct the public sphere norm in a variety of ways, of 
which Habermas’ (1984) formal pragmatic reconstruction of the presuppositions of argumentation 
is the best known. This can be contrasted with Habermas’ (1989) earlier historical reconstruction, 
and with a range of other approaches that draw upon Habermas’ work to various extents, 
including Benhabib (1996), Bohman (1996),  Dryzek (2000), and Gutmann and Thompson (1996).
2. The poststructuralist-infl uenced critique outlined here parallels the concerns of feminists (Dean 
1996, Fraser 1997, Young 2000) and scholars of rhetoric (e.g., Huspek 2007, Phillips 1996).
3. I use “voice” here to refer to the claims and stories that human agents seek recognition for.
4. Regarding norms, normalising, and Foucault, Alexander (2001, note 3, 374) argues that “[t]he 
existence of a norm, and its partial institutionalisation, cannot be equated with normalisation, a 
concept connoting ideological hegemony, social conformity, and de-individuation.” 
5. Examples of diff erent articulations of deliberative democracy, often developing upon 
Habermas’, include Benhabib (1996), Bohman (1996), Chambers (1996), Goodin (2003), Gutman 
and Thompson (1996). Other theorists develop similar public sphere formulations through critical 
dialogue with deliberative democracy, for instance, Dryzek’s (2000) “discursive democracy” and 
Young’s (1996) “communicative democracy.”  
6. In deliberative theory, in contrast to the American rhetoric scholarship, “rhetoric” has tended 
to be aligned with certain forms of aesthetic and aff ective performance as against “rational 
communication.” For example, Habermas makes a distinction between everyday “normal” 
interaction that focuses on problem solving and rhetorical communication that emphasises 
style and enables “world disclosure,” although he understands these modes of communication 
to overlap in practice – the distinction refl ects a continuum rather than a binary opposition (see 
Jasinski 2001, xv-xvii ).
7. See, Dahlberg (2007) for discussion of a range of media counter-publics research. 
8. It needs to be acknowledged that, despite the embrace of radical contingency, poststructuralist 
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theories ... invoke certain infrastructural concepts – e.g., diff erence/diff érance, negativity, 
undecidability, iteration, excess, and radical contingency itself – as uncontestable universals.
9. Mouff e (2005b) prefers to use the term “public spaces” over “public sphere” to emphasise 
plurality and to diff erentiate her “agonistic” approach from that of Habermas’ and other 
deliberative democrats. 
10.  Some deliberative democrats, including Habermas, use “discourse” to refer to a particular 
mode of debate, as in “scientifi c-theoretic discourse” and “practical discourse,” in contrast to the 
very broad defi nition it is given in post-Marxist discourse theory.
11. My discussion here of news is simplifi ed and stylised so as to illustrate concepts from discourse 
theory. For an example of a discourse theory study of journalism and media professionals see 
Carpentier (2005). For further discussion of the relation between discourse theory and media 
communication, see Dahlberg and Phelan (2011). 
12. Some deliberative democrats are now arguing for the inclusion of certain forms of 
“instrumental-strategic” action, such as bargaining, seeing these as complementary to 
deliberation within the contemporary public sphere. However, rational-critical debate continues 
to be seen as the heart of the public sphere and as the basis for democratic legitimacy (Habermas 
1996, Hove 2009).
13. The specifi c concepts and frameworks deployed by deliberative and discourse theory can 
be expected to aff ect the theorising of the public sphere in a range of diff erent ways, beyond 
the theorisation of exclusion discussed in this paper. For example, given its embrace of radical 
contingency and hegemonic logics, discourse theory cannot be used to explicate a set of public 
sphere criteria in the way that deliberative theory can. However, the exploration and elaboration 
of these other diff erences must be left to future research.
14.  Nascent work on conceptualising a discourse theory-media public sphere conception has already 
been undertaken (Mouff e 2005b, Marchart 2011, Dahlberg 2011), but much work is still needed.
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